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Communication and division on the northern border of Catalonia between the 15th and 18th centuries

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ABSTRACT

Catalonia's northern border underwent major shifts during the Modern Age. Wars played a significant role in these changes, as evidenced by the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, a stage in the process which led to the creation of an actual state borderline that the people gradually started to internalise. Nonetheless, the border dwellers still interacted with each other, making it a place of intense exchanges which included them within a larger cultural and economic framework in which they strove to live "as good neighbours", as they themselves put it.

KEYWORDS: trade, conflicts, emigration, border Pyrenees

Catalonia's northern border underwent major changes during the Modern Age. All we have to do is recall the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659, which even today remains a highly symbolic event. The northern border between Catalonia and Languedoc did not shift, but this treaty created a political border right in the middle of Catalan territory by moving the boundary between the monarchies around fifty kilometres to the south, thus separating northern and southern Catalonia. Even though the border shifted, a town like Perpignan was nonetheless still a border town, with all the consequences this entailed; however, Figueres suddenly became one as well, while the entire zone of the diocese of Narbonne and Alet were no longer. Wars did not play a minor role in this process of redefining the borders which culminated in 1659, but though they are the most visible part they are certainly not the only factor.

In northern Catalonia between the Vall d'Aran and the Roussillon plain, how did towns on either side of the political border experience the wars that involved the two state powers which gradually came to control this region from the 15th century to the French Revolution and Empire? What were the relations between the Catalans and Occitans on the border like? These simple questions can only be answered by two opposing words: communication and division. Indeed, the border served to connect people on either side while also separating them at the

same time. This is an ambiguous feature of the border as a place of both intense exchanges (including clashes) and repulsion. Studying the northern border of Catalonia in the Modern Age through the lens of this apparent paradox requires us to first question the elements that hindered communication, including everything that allowed conflict to thrive on the border. After that, we have to see how despite all that, the border dwellers had important relations, which even included them within a larger cultural and economic framework. Finally, since the role of the monarchic states was not negligible in terms of the evolution that led to the creation of a true state borderline, which people gradually came to internalise, we shall conclude by focusing on this process.

DIFFICULT COMMUNICATION...

A border location directly threatened the villages in the event of war between the monarchies, but also in the event of any attack, livestock raid, retaliation or similar act from the neighbouring valley. Thus, borderlands quite often had a high level of self-defence, which was part of the very identity of the villagers (armed villagers). In response, this situation fostered a kind of potential violence between borderlands which could hinder reciprocal relations and prevent communications.

An armed people

We tend to say that border towns were the "natural defenders" of their land. In the Pyrenees, and more general-


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ly in Catalonia as a whole, bearing arms was quite common and one of the privileges for which its inhabitants fought; in fact, they even argued the need to bear arms to protect themselves from the savage beasts that prowled the mountains. Just like any other working tool, they could not be deprived of them. They viewed arms as an inalienable right recognised by the Usatges of Barcelona and the customs of the village of Perpignan,¹ which explained why the Catalans rejected the monarchies' control policies and why despite these policies, bearing weapons was deeply rooted in their mindset. Thus, in Roussillon back in the 18th century, the inhabitants' wish was clearly to conserve this right,² which to them symbolised their freedoms, that is, their way of exercising a kind of political sovereignty that may have already been lost. Regardless, the Spanish and French monarchic powers somehow managed to eliminate it.

The role played by the border dwellers as the defenders of the border was a bit paradoxical, since they ultimately played this role to profit the monarchies, or perhaps more accurately, this role had been revived by the monarchies for their own benefit. The local privileges sometimes mentioned it. For example, the privilege bestowed upon the Couseranais village of Sèish (Seix) by Henry II, King of France, in 1547 was precisely that the inhabitants of the university had to be on watch and armed to prevent enemies of the King of France from passing both night and day in times of war.³ In La Fenolleda (Fenouillèdes), when needed, the inhabitants had to go to the three main castles in the region (Puillorenç [Puilaurens], Fenollet [Fenouillet] and Querbús [Quéribus]) that defended the

border in 1258 between the Crown of Aragon and the Kingdom of France.⁴ All of this implied an almost militaristic organisation of the town into militias, such as the famous Catalan and Andorran militia called by tolling bells and the cry of "Via fora!". In Andorra, a general militia was established in September 1588 in an attempt to reject three "Protestant" companies which were en route to attack La Seu d'Urgell.⁵ Another example is the militia of Prats de Molló (Vallespir), which in 1661 had 276 participants out of a total population of 290 to 330 families, 74% of whom were armed.⁶ In the Vall d'Aran, the royal inspector Juan Francisco de Gracia counted around 700 arquebuses for a population of 854 households in the early 17th century,⁷ that is, theoretically 82% of the residents were armed, a figure that was close to 85% in the western Pyrenees, according to Christian Desplat.⁸ As numerous cases show, men (between the ages of 14 and 60) had to submit to periodic military training on how to handle weapons. This is what occurred in the Vall d'Aran for the Holy Cross of May (the 3rd), when the best shot also received a prize of 16 *rals*. Thus, the image of an armed village was not an exaggeration.

Nor should we forget that the defence and security of the border valleys and villages was based on a dense network of defence and watch towers, castles, churches and fortified villages. In the north of the Vall d'Aran, the triangle made up of the towns and villages of Marinhac (Merignac), Sent Biat (Saint-Béat) and Hòs (Fos)⁹ encompassed seven defensive buildings for around 40 km², while in the Vall d'Àneu the entire system befell the castle of València. In the Vall d'Aran in 1613, the seat of the roy-



MAP 1. Defence system in the central and eastern Pyrenees (16th to 17th centuries).

al governor, Castell-lleó, commanded a network of five castles and, even more importantly, 32 towers, that is, one fortification every 22 km² or, more accurately, one for every 4 km² of populated area, that is, one per every 30.5 households. The towers communicated with each other using smoke signals by day and fire signals by night; thus, information could travel the 45 kilometres from the village of Sant Llorenç de Cerdans (Saint-Laurent-de-Cerdans) in Vallespir to Perpignan in less than one hour.¹⁰ What is more, quite often the Pyrenees villages had closed architecture; that is, the houses were connected to each other by the walls and were part of a kind of fortification without any other exterior wall. We can find this kind of protection in Salardú (Aran), Benasc (Benasque), Sent Biat, Organyà (“wall by the houses themselves”), Àreu (“the houses make a closed wall”) and many other villages.¹¹

The churches, which were quite often fortified, played no lesser a role: they simultaneously served as defence towers and places where the population could take refuge. In exchange for the protection they offered, the inhabitants of the village helped to defend them and defray their costs. This was a kind of collective participation which somehow created a “citizenry”, since participating in the defence and its costs implied having political rights. Gilbert Larguier says this clearly regarding Perpignan when he claims that the payment of municipal taxes and the defence of the village were the foundational acts of citizenship.¹²

However, while there was a line of defence on either side of the border between the Vall d’Aran and Roussillon (“border of Perpignan”) in the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries, we cannot say that this border was “iron-clad”, like the one Vauban built later. Nonetheless, we are well aware of the desire of a monarch like Philip II to reinforce the political border, although he came upon a different reality: maintenance of the fortification and troops was too expensive, there was a shortage of weapons and the garrisons were too few and far between.

CONFLICTS AMONG NEIGHBOURS

Violence was one of the elements that hindered communication among the valleys, even though we could also say that it was a form of border relations. First of all, we should make an initial, important remark: this violence – which we could call peasant or pastoral wars – was not exclusive to cross-border relations but instead was a normal condition in the relations between any valley or village, regardless of its political location.¹³ On the other hand, there is no need to wait for the religious wars in the second half of the 16th century to witness a spate of violent acts. For example, in Couserans in 1540, the inhabitants explained that they had been attacked three times in 100 years by armed gangs from the Iberian lands, who had pillaged them, taken them prisoner and demanded

ransom.¹⁴ One of the bosses was Benet Marcó, who had earned the title of Baron of Lés (Aran) from King Joan II on the 15th of April 1478 for having fought back an invasion of infants and knights led by the lords of Armagnac, Aura and Comminges.

Banditry fed off of this conflictive situation, while it also fed it: what was the difference between a gang of bandits and a gang of mere attackers from a neighbouring village? Being located on the peripheries of the monarchies in an area of mountainous borders reinforced the impunity of these actions, which were sometimes concealed behind the acts of war. In 1542, when a Spanish infantry company with a few men from the Cerdagne went to France and took away 400 cows, how can we describe this act of retaliation as a likely attack from Puigcerdà?¹⁵ As an act of war, banditry, pillage? Does the fact that this act took place during the conflict between Charles V and Francis I make it an act of war?

If we talk about the simple conflicts caused by proximity, we should not downplay the role of the wars waged by the kings of France and Aragon-Catalonia, and later the Hispanic monarchies. Roussillon experienced this countless times during the Catalan Revolution of 1462 and the French occupation until 1493, and even in the ensuing years, such as in 1496 and 1502, when French armies attacked the castle of Salses, a key link of the defence of the entrance into Roussillon.¹⁶ Altogether it was “an endemic state of war”, to revisit a title by Núria Sales,¹⁷ with which the border villages had to live. Before the religious wars, northern Catalonia and especially the countships of Roussillon and Cerdagne were affected by invasions or armed incursions in 1502-1509, 1512-1526, 1535-1538, 1542-1544 and 1557-1559, with their respective sieges, destruction, raids and pillaging. These punitive expeditions most likely occurred in both directions, with each side acting the same, which led to retaliation which in turn justified further retaliation, thus creating a circle of violence and border pillages. For example, the General Captaincy of the countships attacked villages in Les Fenolledes of Languedoc in 1537, setting fire to and pillaging Sornia (Sournia), Sant Pau de Fenollet (Saint-Paul-de-Fenouillet), Tuixà (Tuchan), Pasiòls (Paziols) and other sites in that region.¹⁸

The religious wars that got underway within the kingdom of France in 1562 may be regarded as a decisive moment in the process of conflict among the valleys, an important stage in which opposing identities were crystallised, when the representations of the monarchic authorities were not negligible. We should not downplay the Spaniards’ rejection of Protestantism and its lasting consequences on cross-border relations. However, while this is the aspect which we are discussing in this paper, we should not forget that the religious conflicts first touched the lands under French administration and opposed the Protestant and Catholic zones, or even more, the villages between them, before the border regions.

The times of the religious wars

This is not the place to offer a complete history of the religious wars that profoundly divided the kingdom of France between 1562 and 1598, but instead we aim to shed light on how these events played a role in border relations. The connection between the “Protestant” – or supposedly Protestant – gangs and the Catalan bandits who were “allied” or that fought each other is well known. Some bandits had been fighting against the Protestants since 1652, such as Perot de Llupià, the Lord of Llupià (Llupia) and Castellnou (Castelnou) (northern Catalan countships) and the leader of bandits who ultimately ended up fighting the Huguenots from Languedoc, taking the side of Marshal Joyeuse¹⁹ at the head of around 700 or 800 “Gascon” bandits, who died in the siege of Montpellier in September 1562. Between the autumn of 1562 and the spring of 1563, other bandits participated in the siege led by Blaise de Monluc in another hub of Occitan Protestantism, Montalbà de Carci (Montauban).²⁰

The opposite also happened. In 1571-1572, the Spanish Inquisition accused the Ripoll-based bandit Joan Escuder, known as “the Lutheran”, of having participated in the seizure of Tarascó (Tarascon), a village in Foix, and of having been chosen consul by the local Huguenots. This area, the upper countship of Foix or Savartès, had become what Xavier Torres calls a sanctuary of the Catalan gangs on the other side of a border that had become protective.²¹ Indeed, the sources consider the towns or villages of Mèrens (Mérens), L’Ospitalet (L’Hospitalet), Lusenac (Luzenac) and Acs (Aix) as the refuges of *cadells* like Cua de Llop and Barbafina.²² From this standpoint, the meaning of the excerpts from the documents cited by Lluís Obiols Perearnau²³ is clear. Thus, after Joanot Cadell had fled the siege of Arsèguel, the consuls of Puigcerdà wrote on the 15th of November 1592 that, based on reports from their spies, they knew that many places in the countship of Foix harboured many armed people and that Joan Cadell from Arsèguel was marauding through the village of Tarascó with French knights as if it were his own home...

Even in 1598, there were “many native-born bandits from Cerdagne” who had taken refuge in the countship of Foix after the destruction of the castle of Arsèguel. And without a doubt, these kinds of testimonials could go on and on. Unions between Catalan and “Protestant” bandits from Foix were hardly rare, it seems. More than 300 of the latter under the orders of Galceran Cadell attacked Bagà and Puigcerdà in 1581. In the west during the 1560s, the same could be said of the gang led by the bailiff of Vilac (Aran) and Joan Arjó de Pier, who regrouped “Lutherans” in order to defile and rob churches; in fact, they even murdered a governor. The bailiff of Vilac was also accused of smuggling horses to the kingdom of France, his place of refuge where he had family.²⁴ His action was similar to those of the “*mossurs* of the border”,²⁵ which were well known along the borders from Aragon and Béarn and from Aragon and Bigorra in the western and cen-

tral Pyrenees. Thanks to their personal and family connections on either side of the political border, they engaged in illegal horse trading,²⁶ organised raids and played at being the local “war lords”, albeit on their own scale. They used the context of the religious wars to conduct their lucrative activities.

Obviously, under no circumstances can we say that religious ideology was what bound these heteroclitic bandits together, and we can even question the religious orientation of those called “Protestants”. But for the time being, we shall stress the presence of Occitans among the bandits. It is very difficult to know it with certainty, and we can only make approximate guesses based on the documentation. For example, if we consider all the bandits mentioned in the *Dietari de la Generalitat de Catalunya* for the year 1573,²⁷ that is, 140 names whose origins we know, 95.55% were Occitans.²⁸ However, of the 110 “aroused and torn from peace and truce” by the cry of the viceroy on the 30th of June 1593, at least 24% were Occitans.²⁹ These are two different cases with very different proportions, but both allow us to say that the presence of Occitans was not negligible. What is more, the timeline of the “Protestant” incursions southward and the actions of the bandits exemplify how the “official” war was fostered. In reality, the war turned all local or private conflicts into legitimate ware fare, and even encouraged them. Thus, it should come as no surprise that during the war between the French and Spanish in 1595 to 1598, that is, during the waning days of the religious wars, we can count an annual mean of 4.72 times more incursions and levies by bandits crossing the political border than between 1562 and 1590.

Can we figure out who the ones called “Lutherans” were, those often accused of boosting the ranks of the bandits? If we examine the case of the Viscount of Sent Gironç (Saint-Girons), Aimeric of Narbonne, we are faced with many doubts as to the religious identity of these supposed “Lutherans”. Aimeric became known at the helm of the “more than 300 Lutherans” who attacked the Vall d’Aran and El Pallars in November 1597, according to the documentation of the Council of Aragon.³⁰ And yet he was one of the last faithful in the Catholic League who recognised Henry IV as the King of France, albeit too late. It would be a stretch to label him a Protestant! On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the valleys of Couserans and Comminges, from which these “more than 300 Lutherans” had come, were not Protestant, quite the contrary: they had remained Catholic, unlike the neighbouring countship of Foix. Therefore, it is possible that the supposedly “Lutheran” gangs were essentially made up of Catholics. What is more, the valleys and villages of Couserans attacked by the Barons of Eroles and Erill in May 1598 in retaliation for the attacks of 1597 were not Protestants. Therefore, we have to conclude that the descriptor “Lutherans” applied to the aggressors coming from north of the political border did not reveal their religious affiliation, although it did give them a particular identity that stigmatised them.

There is no doubt that there were Protestants on the borders of the Kingdom of France, but they did not make up the bulk of the gangs accused of being comprised of them. Lutherans, Protestants, Huguenots... these words have become a kind of appellative, an ethnic adjective which, based on the stigmatisation of a specific group, ends up referring to a population viewed as a whole, even when it has nothing to do with the original group.

...AND DESPITE IT ALL, INTENSE RELATIONS

Even though we have just described a fairly conflictive situation around the northern border of Catalonia due to a population which had to ensure the armed defence not only of their territory but also of the monarchic boundaries within a climate of international wars and in a general context which could be called the “economy of pillage” and in the particular context of the religious wars, the Catalan and Occitan borders had very close relations for centuries. These relations were economic and commercial, cultural and linguistic, and more generally human, such that we do not view it as overly exaggerated to talk about a true human community which spanned a vast territory joining the northern and southern sides of the Pyrenees.

A cultural community

Language is a key feature in the relations between the Catalans and the Occitans. Since the late 19th century, with a decline in relations of proximity and the spread of the state languages, the Pyrenees have gradually become a linguistic border between Occitan and Catalan, since the languages that are spoken are regarded as different. In fact, this claim was expressed by the signatories of the text that appeared in *La Veu de Catalunya* on the 8th of May 1934: “Catalan and Occitan are two different languages, two separate language groups”. These Catalanists from the 1930s had no doubt; of course, they also needed Catalan to become separate at this important juncture in Catalonia’s political history. However, despite that, there is still a strong linguistic community between Occitan and Catalan which may show the greatest similarities between the two Romance languages. In the Modern Age, when the powerful monarchic states were founded which built stronger borders which, in turn, ruptured human relations, we have clear testimonials of the Occitan-Catalan linguistic community. We shall examine several from different sources as examples.

In 1579, when the viceroy of Catalonia said that he did not trust the soldiers from Perpignan because he claimed there was a mixture between “French and Gascon” Catalans who spoke Catalan in the same way, we see the true linguistic and human proximity that joined the peoples on either side of the border. Some Spanish writers from the 17th and 18th centuries bore witness to this as well. One example is Francisco de Cepeda, who wrote in 1643


that the Catalan language was very similar to the Limousin spoken by the people from Languedoc. Likewise, one century later, in 1752, Pedro Murillo Velarde noted in his *Geografía histórica* that the Catalans spoke the Limousin language, and in 1791, Pascual Ramón Gutiérrez de la Hacería stated the same in *Descripción general de la Europa y particular de sus Estados y Cortes*.

English travellers in the 18th century made similar observations, such as Richard Twiss, who in 1772 wrote that Catalan is “a strange dialect similar to Limousin”. In turn, when speaking about the Valencians and Catalans in 1775, Henry Swinburne wrote that “their language is not understood by the Spaniards; it is a dialect of the old Limousin, a kind of Gascon”. Likewise, when John Talbot Dillon was in L’Horta de València in 1778, he explained that “the language of this country is a dialect of Provençal”. As he travelled through the Maresme region in 1787, Arthur Young noted that the same language was spoken in Languedoc and Catalonia, the language of the entire southern portion of the kingdom of France. We have to wait until much later, the 19th century, to find similar notes from travellers coming from France. We could cite Charles Davillier, who was in the region of Valencia during the 1860s and wrote that Valencian sprang from the ancient Limousin language. Antoine de Latour, a Limousin in Valencia in 1877, believed that the people of Valencia still spoke Limousin, while the Provençal Màrius Bernard, also in the region of Valencia in around 1880, thought that the people there spoke a “corrupt by-product of our Provençal, the dry sibling of our Lengua d’Òc” that is, a version of the Occitan language.

All of these testimonials indicate the same thing: Valencians, Catalans, natives of Languedoc, Gascons, Limousins and Provençals all spoke forms of the same language. And it is certainly no coincidence but instead, as Talbot Dillon explained, because all of them were the lands of the troubadours, that is, they were all the heirs to a cultural unit known since the Middle Ages. In Catalonia, the sense of linguistic unity had not disappeared and still remained alive in the 18th century. We should recall the case of the canon Antoni de Bastero i Lledó (approx. 1675-1737): when travelling through the lands of Occitan, he returned with linguistic data on the different dialects that illustrated everything we have just discussed.³¹ Thus, in a letter written to Rome in June 1723, Bastero explained that the Provençal language (that is, Occitan), was “the same as our Catalan or Limousin”.

Trade privileges

The trade exchanges across the political border of the Pyrenees benefitted from a series of treaties and privileges. For example, we can mention the “Index of Privileges” of Andorra,³² which explained that the Andorrans had privileges when trading with France, even when it was at war with Spain, and that they were able to get everything the valleys needed from France (wheat, bread, legumes, wine, oil, cattle, sheep, meat, etc.) without paying any levies.



MAP 2. Geography of the oaths of peace on the northern borders of modern-day Catalonia.

Likewise, Cerdagne and the countship of Foix even traded in times of war as well, as mentioned in the *Dietari de la fidelíssima vila de Puigcerdà* when it states that in 1543 there was trade between the countship of Cerdagne and Capcir and the countship of Foix and Donasà, even though there was a war between France and Spain. The same happened in 1554.³³ This privilege was confirmed for the inhabitants of the villages of Acs, Merens and Donasà in 1595 by the Count of Foix and King of Navarre, who was also the King of France (Henry IV).³⁴

The *Manual Digest* from 1748 also stated that the Andorran parishes of Canillo and Ordino had the authority to send six deputies per year to swear an oath of peace (commonly called “*las Paisseries*”) with other universities in the countship of Foix.³⁵ This excerpt mentions the *patzeries* or *lligues i patzeries* (peace agreements), treaties which joined valleys or groups of valleys which had to be periodically confirmed or renewed. They allowed the valleys to maintain relations even during times of war between the monarchies, rendering them more or less neutral.³⁶ The expression *lligues i patzeries*, a Catalan version of the Occitan *ligas e patzariás* or *patzerias*, stresses the two aspects of the treaties, that is, alliances (*ligas*) and peace (*patzerias* from the Occitan *patz*: peace). These treaties were defined by three components: the pastoral part, the commercial part (free trade) and the postponement of wars. After the 16th century, the *lligues i patzeries* ran up against the birth of European diplomacy and

the large states’ disputes over the border. We can distinguish two major types of treaties: bilateral, such as the ones linking an Andorran parish with a parish in the countship of Foix, and multilateral, such as the ones that joined several different valleys, the most important of which was signed on the 22nd of April 1513 at the Pla d’Arrem (Plan d’Arrem)³⁷ (Comminges, on the border of the Vall d’Aran), creating a district measuring around 10,000 km². The representatives of more than 20 Occitan, Catalan and Aragonese valleys gathered there to sign a treaty, the most prominent features of which, for our purposes, were the commercial clauses and the postponement of wars.³⁸

Trade relations

The treaties we have just presented allowed inhabitants on either side of the political border to engage in more or less intense trade. Some products arrived from far away, and once they crossed the line they continued their long journey, while others were part of more local trade, usually of the goods that the high Pyrenees valleys and the border villages needed in order to survive. Running north to south, the products can be summarised by the Iberian trilogy of wool, salt and oil, along with a few more products, such as horses (which were smuggled to the Kingdom of France), local foodstuffs (butter, cheese) and Pyrenees iron (from Andorra and from the Cerdagne to Foix, from which it was sold in Toulouse or in the port of Nar-

bonne, for example). Wool was very important for the weavers of *cordellat*, a thick woollen fabric, in the small villages in the northern Pyrenees and Languedoc.

Trade in Catalan salt was an ages-old activity in the Pyrenees which benefited from the privileges such as the ones granted by the counts of Foix in the Middle Ages. A report on cross-Pyrenees relations and the *lrigues i patzeries* in the Land of Foix³⁹ from 1680 on clearly states that the people could not maintain the livestock they owned without the salt from Cardona because of its quality, which was regarded as much higher than Mediterranean and Atlantic salt. The salt from Cardona entered on packs of mules through the Pimorent pass (Porté-Puymorens) and Andorra, and it often followed the trail northward to Toulouse and Languedoc... as smuggled goods. Salt from Llavorsí and Gerri de la Sal entered in Comminges and Couserans. In 1660, when the French monarchy created the customs *gabella* on salt in the new province of Roussillon, the legal trade of salt from Cardona to Roussillon immediately became illegal. We thus see how a political decision had repercussions on the trade networks: the Treaty of the Pyrenees signalled a structural change in cross-Pyrenees trade.

Wool, oil and salt often served as currency to pay back loans, or even more often to pay for mules, mares or colts. Thus, Joan Anglès, a carrier from Llivia, purchased three mules and one mare in exchange for 12.25 *quintars* of raw wool in the village of Acs in May 1641.⁴⁰ Another time, a merchant from Auvergne living in Puigcerdà promised to pay for the mule he had just purchased with oil.⁴¹ Oil was also purchased in the Land of Foix by merchants from Béarn who went there to sell their shepherds' capes for the Catalan market.

Running north to south, fabrics, textiles, shepherds' capes, fish and grains were first sent to other lands and then followed the route into inland Catalonia. Mules were an extremely important trade good which had carved out a network between the central massif in the Kingdom of France (where they were born) and the Iberian Peninsula (where a market had developed); some valleys in the Pyrenees (such as Vall d'Aran and later Andorra) specialised in breeding and trading them. Catalans, Andorrans and Aragonese went to buy them at the fairs in the Pyrenees, although sometimes they went directly to the production centres, especially in Rodès, which hosted a large mule fair attended by people from the Spanish monarchy and much of the Kingdom of France.⁴²

Béarnaise capes were another major trade good. Crafted in eastern Béarn and sold by merchants in the tiny village of Pontac, they fed a commercial trade route which continued and travelled the north of the Pyrenees, from west to east, at least as far as Narbonne. Land routes towards Catalonia and Andorra went through the Vall d'Aran and the upper countship of Foix, where the people from Pontac sold them to local merchants, who resold them wholesale to intermediaries living in Andorra and Catalonia. The sale of capes shaped a more complete a

system of goods circulation, since the Béarnaise merchants accepted payment with wool, olive oil, woollen fabric or horses. Béarnaise merchants and carriers with capes heading to Girona went through the easternmost part of the Catalan Pyrenees, at Vinçà and Millars, two customs points in the Conflent.⁴³

Because of their importance, we should also mention trade in conger eel, codfish, sardines and herring by merchants from Toulouse via Arieja (Ariège) Valley towards Andorra and Catalonia. They were joined by many other products and objects which we can find in a legal proceeding or mentioned by visits from the General: cards, all sorts of hats, leather, copper, lead, spices, sugar, tobacco, pie, combs, stockings, needles, knives, keys, spades, cowbells, hooks, receptacles, etc. All of these products filled the shops owned in Andorra and Catalonia by the emigrant merchants from Occitan, who were the true actors in this trade.

Occitan emigration to Catalonia

According to a Spanish document, in 1536 more than half the population of Perpignan came from the Kingdom of France;⁴⁴ in 1542 they were deemed useful for the economy of Roussillon.⁴⁵ Likewise, in 1572 the Inquisition estimated that most of the population of La Seu d'Urgell was made up of families from France.⁴⁶ It is possible that all these testimonies exaggerate the "French" presence, meaning the Occitan presence, but the problem was in no way recent, since the Courts of Montsó in 1510 banned all of these "French" people from carrying crossbows or any other weapons, except for a staff and a sharpened knife, throughout the entire Principality of Catalonia and the countships of Roussillon and Cerdagne.⁴⁷ This emigration has sparked a large number of local or regional studies⁴⁸ and vast amounts of more general research, including the pioneering study by Jordi Nadal and Emili Giralt published in Paris in 1960.⁴⁹ It is very difficult to get a quantitative idea of these emigrants. Thanks to the list of the "French" on the Catalan coast in 1637, established by the monarchical authorities after France's declaration of war against Spain in 1635, we can gain a snapshot of a specific place and time. First of all, more than 99% of these "French" people came from Occitania, which, as explained above, must have made it easier for them to integrate. Likewise, a little over half (53.5%) were natives of the bishoprics at the foothills of the Pyrenees, Bayonne to the west and Alet to the east. The diocese of Comminges by itself was the source of 20% of the emigrants; 15% arrived from Auvergne and Limousin. The others were divided among other dioceses in Languedoc, some of them Provençal and Dauphinoise.

The trades that were practised are a good example of their fit within the society and economy. Fifty-eight percent of them worked in farming, 45% with crops and 13% with livestock, very often as day labourers or shepherds, that is, in the less qualified jobs. In contrast, only 7% worked as artisans, especially in woodworking and con-

struction, activities that appear as the traditional specialities of the emigrants from Limousin and Auvergne.⁵⁰ Some of them also worked in agriculture (25%), and very few from the Pyrenees and Aquitaine worked as artisans (4 to 6%). Commercial activities were in the minority but were monopolised by the emigrants from Limousin and Auvergne, for which this trade represented a kind of identity different to their fellow emigrants. On the boundary between crafts and trade, Auvergne sent a large number of boilersmiths who set up shop the villages and towns of Catalonia, sparking a commercial network and cross-border space from Auvergne and Limousin to Catalonia. What we view as the most noteworthy is that the highlands in Auvergne and Limousin supplied the Pyrenees and western Catalonia with merchants who set up their shops there and moved between north and south, constantly crossing the political border. Emigrants went to this corridor, especially to Toulouse but also to the small Pyrenees villages, to get supplies, as if these places were supply posts for part of Catalonia, at least the Pyrenees and western region.⁵¹

All of this proves that despite the political border, there were trade and more generally human relations between the north and south of the line at least in the 16th and 17th centuries. People travelled, sometimes laden with goods. Trade activity, which fed its own channel of emigration, had privileges that made it easier. We could also mention the very close local relations based on pilgrimages, and, in a different sphere, the role of the Occitan universities – especially the one in Toulouse – as centres where Catalan students were educated.⁵² Yet did these relations not suffer from the monarchies' policies, either directly or indirectly?

FROM COMMUNICATION TO DIVISION: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LINEAR BORDER (16TH-18TH CENTURIES)

The situation presented in the first part of this article, that is, a context of local violence on the border characterised by raids and incursions among the border valleys and villages, exacerbated by the international wars, resulted in a more large-scale intervention by the monarchic states, which were gaining ground and needed their borders to be controlled and, in some cases, closed. State control led to the reinforcement of a political border which the people strove to ignore but had to be aware of. How did the wars in the 17th century and Louis XIV's policies affect border relations? Was the peace of the 18th century favourable to these relations?

A process of reinforcement in the 16th century

Border problems and the desire to control them had repercussions on the jurisdictions, on the role given to the Inquisition, and on the redefinition of the dioceses, in addition to the struggle against bearing arms and banditry,

which were viewed as symptoms of the monarchy's lack of control and its impotence to act on its sovereignty.

Border defence was nothing new in the second half of the 16th century, but the fear of Protestantism led Philip II to fortify it even further. We are particularly aware of the Hapsburgs' concern with the two most open passes into Catalonia, namely Vall d'Aran in the west and Roussillon in the east. Both zones were the targets of special attention, which meant supplying them with more troops and more weapons and renovating the defence structures or building new ones. In 1588, the monarchy had demanded that repairs be made at the Aranese fortress of Castell-Ileó and that the armaments be reinforced. For example, four pieces of artillery were brought from Barcelona, and construction on the fortifications seemed to be concluded by August 1589. However, all of this was apparently not enough, since starting in 1596 the government and General Council asked for more repairs, and in 1598, after the so-called "Lutheran" invasions, they called for more weapons. Having said this, we should not think that the monarch's will was always carried out: in 1594 Philip II demanded that there be 40 soldiers inside the Aranese fortress, but there were only 34 in 1598, 25 in 1613 and 18 in 1622.⁵³ It is obvious that if his will was indeed clearly defined, it clashed with the reality of local resources and situations. The representatives of the monarchies were fully aware of this, given what the viceroy of Catalonia evoked in 1579, when he wrote that he could not trust the Catalan soldiers from Perpignan – he claimed that they were mixed with the "French" soldiers who spoke the language like the natives – to protect Roussillon. This was why the lieutenant of the countships had attempted to remove the Catalan soldiers and officers in 1572, as they were very negatively perceived for the defence of the land on behalf of the monarchy.⁵⁴

One of the reproaches to the Catalans from Perpignan and the Aranese was their likely connection to banditry, the repression of which was an essential avenue of action by the royal power, thus reinforcing it. The fight against the bandits was waged in numerous ways: the most important one, in addition to direct armed struggle against the gangs, was the desire to ban or at least restrict the right to bear and use weapons. For example, in 1560 the viceroy of Catalonia banned harquebuses and flint-lock rifles; in 1575, his successor dictated the length of authorised weapons; in 1585, the Courts of Montsó banned short weapons which were easier to conceal; and the Courts of 1599 did the same with flint-lock rifles, which sparked the opposition of the knights. Thus, in 1503, the viceroy had to once again publish the prohibitions, which concerned short flint-lock guns less than three or four palms long which were more easily concealed under clothing, as promulgated by the pragmatic from 1612 issued by the viceroy, the Marquis of Almazán.⁵⁵

The possession and potential use of firearms led to measures to assure public safety in many places. In Andorra, ordinances handed down from the Court of Justice

of the valleys in 1580 banned gatherings of groups of people armed with any weapon (lances, halberds, crossbows, arquebuses, shotguns, flint-lock rifles, pistols).⁵⁶ Likewise, in the Vall d'Aran, the royal *Ordinacions* published in 1616 banned people from bearing loaded weapons by day and night in the villages and towns of the valley under the penalty of a fine and ten years of exile or the galley for recidivists.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the universities also issued their own ordinances on the use of weapons, such as the Andorran parish of Sant Julià de Lòria in 1588 and the Aranese towns of Salardú and Tredòs in 1610, when they decided that when the men went to the community Council they had to leave their weapons “ten steps away from the council” to avoid any problems. Sant Julià de Lòria asked that no one could nor should dare to shoot with a flint-lock rifle or any other weapon from the bell tower, which helps us to gain insight into the situation at that time.

On the other hand, the viceregal authorities somewhat successfully issued pardons and absolutions of bandits; that is, they were allowed to join the royal armies with the heads of the bandits as the captains of Spanish *tercios* that usually served abroad.⁵⁸ As Xavier Torres noted, and as discussed above, the participation of Catalan bandits – and lords – in the French religious wars (such as the sieges of Montalbà and Montpellier) may have been a consequence of this policy of rehabilitating the bandit gangs. The repression of the Revolt of the Brotherhoods in Valencia and later the Morisco Revolt in the Kingdom of Granada in 1568 also had the assistance of the Catalan bandits mobilised to serve the monarchy.⁵⁹ In the Vall d'Aran, a decree dated the 28th of June 1636 pardoned 24 people from the gang of Pere Amorós de Miquel who had been accused of assassinating the royal governor. The pardon was issued under the condition that Amorós, as a captain, lead a company that included the Aranese criminals; in 1638, 47 men were in this company, which joined the *tercio* that Olivares sent to Hondarribia.⁶⁰


As another tack, Philip II promoted a change in the geography of the dioceses to better control them and protect them from the Protestant contagion, with an added difficulty in Aran: the political and religious borders did not match. We know about the creation of the diocese of Barbastro in Aragon in 1571, which amputated the bishopric of Lleida from an entire western Aragonese strip, as well as the diocese of Solsona in 1593. On a different level, the diocese of Elna was detached from the archbishopric of Narbonne and added to the archbishopric of Tarragona in 1563-1564 after the Council of Trent.⁶¹ Regarding the Vall d'Aran, none of the different attempts to incorporate it into the diocese of Urgell succeeded, neither the one in 1565 nor the one in 1570.⁶² And we should not forget the attempt by the Tribunal of the Inquisition of Barcelona to secure jurisdiction over Andorra and Aran, which it was always denied.⁶³

The wars of the 17th century and their border consequences

The Thirty Years' War and its prolongation until the Treaty of the Pyrenees had twofold consequences on the Catalan border. The first is that it allowed the monarchies to learn more about the territory thanks to the direct presence of soldiers, who needed better knowledge of the land in order to move about. The second well-known consequence was the new location of the border further to the south in 1659. The process that got underway continued with the wars in the second half of the century and with the War of the Spanish Succession in the early years of the next century. At all times, it became clear that that monarchy's presence on the border was becoming stronger and more physically visible.

Article 42 of the Treaty of the Pyrenees signed on the 7th of November 1659 stated, in the Spanish version, that “the Pyrenees mountains, which have commonly been taken as the division between the Spanish and the French, shall henceforth be the division of their kingdoms as well”, while the French version said that “the Pyrenees mountains, which formerly divided the French from the Spanish, shall now also mark the division of the two same kingdoms”. And thus began the disputes on where exactly these Pyrenees mountains were. In reality, if the treaty defined the political border between the two monarchies using a historical criterion (former boundary between Spain and France) and a geographic criterion (the Pyrenees mountains, which evoked a “natural border”), the result created more difficulties even after the negotiations between the representatives of the French king and the Spanish monarch held in Ceret in 1660. What is more, the border established in 1659-1660 was apparently not considered the definitive one by the French (not to mention the Spaniards), judging by the attempts to exchange Roussillon and Cerdagne for the Netherlands which were waged countless times between 1668 and 1677.⁶⁴ These affairs show that France did not want the state border to be the Pyrenees crest, viewed as the “natural border”, at any price, but that instead it tried to secure the Netherlands – which it was more interested in from the geopolitical and geostrategic standpoint – in exchange for the newly conquered province.

On the other hand, referring to the supposed theory of natural borders, the Treaty of the Pyrenees kept an anomaly – the Vall d'Aran in the north of the Pyrenees, but left within the Spanish monarchy – and created another one – Cerdagne, with 33 annexed villages. Indeed, this area of Cerdagne, which is part of the Segre River basin, is on the southern face of the mountain, but thenceforth it became part of France within the province of Roussillon.⁶⁵ What is more, since the “Spanish” Vall d'Aran was part of a diocese whose bishopric was in the kingdom of France, Cerdagne, conceded to the King of France, remained part of the diocese of La Seu d'Urgell, which created divergent borders and led to jurisdictional problems which we can illustrate with an example cited by Alícia Marcet.⁶⁶



MAP 3. The political border in the central and eastern Pyrenees before and after the Treaty of the Pyrenees.

In Palau-de-Cerdagne, a town conceded to France, the bishop of Urgell appointed Rafel Prada, a Cerdagne resident originally from Llívia, which was now under Spanish control, as the parish rector. In 1666, the French authorities complained of this appointment, as they regarded Prada as a foreigner who could not exercise his priesthood there. We can clearly see how a treaty between states had almost immediate local consequences on the everyday lives of the villages and people. Despite this, by studying the geography of marriages in Cerdagne in the 17th and 18th centuries, Marc Conesa demonstrates that marital bonds remained the same as before the Treaty of the Pyrenees; that is, the political border did not break the human relations in the Cerdagne basin.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, it should come as no surprise that at the conferences of Figueres (1666-1668), the French minister Louvois promoted an agreement which stated that the bishop of Comminges would give the Vall d’Aran to the bishop of Urgell on the condition that it be exchanged with Cerdagne, which would become part of the diocese of Alet.⁶⁸ A project like this exchange of Church jurisdictions between Cerdagne and Aran was brought up again in 1785,⁶⁹ but to no avail; instead, it had to await the Concordat of 1801 between Bonaparte and Pope Pius VII before the state and Church jurisdictions between France and Spain were brought into alignment. We believe that this long episode, which lasted from 1659 to 1801, clearly shows that what the monarchies sought was not so much the juxtaposition of a political and a “natural” border but the match of the different jurisdictions – in order to avoid any ambiguity that might be favourable to the local peoples – and to create a truly convergent borderline that would replace a border zone, a frontier space. In other

words, the Pyrenees ceased simply marking the border and instead became a line of separation.

Indeed, for a long time the word “border” referred to a more or less broad swath of land, a kind of peripheral area that was poorly controlled by the states’ distant political centres.⁷⁰ The long periods of wars in the 17th and early 18th centuries allowed the topography of the Pyrenees to become much better known, particularly the hills, pathways, passes, etc., where the campaigning troops had to go and where they could be supplied. Thus, the reports that described the land increased in number, and the cartography made great strides. What is more, the border fortifications due to Vauban after the Treaty of 1659, such as the sites in Perpignan and Vilafranca de Conflent, the walls in Prats de Molló, the fort in Arles and several others, in addition to the symbolic construction of the fortress of Montlluís between 1681 and 1691 to keep watch over the pass between Cerdagne and Conflent-Rosselló,⁷¹ materialised the border, rendering it clearly visible to the local people. As Daniel Nordman wrote, the wars left two legacies: stone (the fortifications) and paper (the maps), material proof of the construction of a border line.⁷² The consequence was profound on spirits: the border dwellers had to internalise the existence of a state border which often broke down the ancient solidarities. Thus, the border towns, which were sometimes even separated by redrawn political boundaries, had to match their states, creating a true mental border. We should not underestimate the role played the religious wars in the 16th century in a process which we believed accelerated in the second half of the 17th century.⁷³ What is more, in the principality of Catalonia, the wars at the end of the 17th century and the constant flow of French troops further accentuated the

Francophobia.⁷⁴ It should come as no surprise that the French were generally rejected at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession. Louis XIV's policy of promoting the fortification and militarisation of the new border, along with permanent contingents of soldiers, allowed his authority to be consolidated and recognised, while, as we know, the inhabitants of Roussillon did not accept the changes in sovereignty in 1659 without reacting. Nonetheless, the War of the Spanish Succession put an end to a long process, leading to a rupture of the manifold ties between Roussillon and the Principality, between Comminges-Couserans and Aran, between the countship of Foix and Andorra and Pallars. If the Catalans of the Principality developed Francophobia, in the northern Catalan countships, the War of the Spanish Succession and the Quadruple Alliance contributed, in the words of Ramon Sala, "to giving Roussillon a very negative image of the residents of the Principality" such that "local patriotism and the border carved a separation between the two Catalonias".⁷⁵

The distancing in the 18th century

Beginning with the War of the Spanish Succession, the 18th century introduced a major change and accelerated the evolution towards the decline of cross-border relations, especially trade treaties. States used suspensions of trade privileges as weapons of war – and effective ones, at that – a circumstance that points to these monarchic states' powerful intervention in a sphere in which the valleys had played a major role until then. We can say that cross-border agreements became local phenomena, tolerated if they did not question the interests of the kingdoms which now exerted better control on either side of the political border. Thus, the kings were in no hurry to confirm the customs privileges of the borders, as happened with Aran, where the privileges were still not recognised by the French sovereign by 1756. Likewise, a letter sent by the consuls of Sèish (Couserans) to those of Salardú (Aran) on the 24th of July 1767 indicates that the inhabitants confirmed the *l·ligues i patzeries* only in 1744 and 1763, while they were usually supposed to do so every year.⁷⁶ We believe that all of this hindered trade between the valleys and neighbouring villages at the expense of the old *l·ligues i patzeries* agreements, but it also meant that things had changed.

In the 18th century, cross-Pyrenees trade most likely remained important, even though we are lacking specific studies on this activity. However, it was no longer a vital need, and the northern Pyrenees residents of the Kingdom of France gradually shifted towards the plains and consequently towards the French home market. The construction of a new network of roads illustrates the French royal authorities' zeal to channel trade exchanges from the Pyrenees towards the French market. The intention was to unlock the valleys, that is, to connect them to the regional capitals and from there to the political centre of the monarchy. This dealt a very harsh blow to cross-Pyre-

nees trade relations, since after the new roads were built it was easier to trade with the plains than to use the old mule pathways that crisscrossed the mountains. However, we should also mention the effects of Spanish protectionism, which fostered the development of internal production and markets. Everything contributed to gearing trade relations towards the plains and large cities, and ultimately to a dissociation between the denizens on either side of the border. Thus, the content of the treaties was gradually reduced to pastoral agreements, while the content of the clauses postponing wars were stripped of their more political meaning.⁷⁷ Paradoxically, the absence of war in the Pyrenees after the 1720s led the old obligations to be forgotten, and the old relations and solidarities gradually eroded. In this sense, despite its particular geopolitical situation,⁷⁸ the case of the Vall d'Aran illustrates the wider evolution of the trade network. As Maria Àngels Sallèhy wrote: "The sphere of attraction of the merchants from the Vall d'Aran stretched north and south. In the modern era, there was a gradual tendency to associate with the southern market. Whereas the wheat came from the north in the 17th century, by the 18th century it came from the south."⁷⁹

From another vantage point, the wars of the French Revolution and the Empire did not contribute to bringing the border peoples closer together again the way previous wars had. With the actions of the irregulars (formerly the bandits), the border once again became unsafe, and when the revolutionary troops occupied Puigcerdà, Bellver de Cerdanya and La Seu d'Urgell in 1793-1794, or entered the Empordà, the enemy was once again the "French", just as it had been two centuries earlier. As a result, the mental border was even further strengthened.

Living on the border meant being exposed to the perils of war during a period when there was an endless succession of conflicts. War was somehow part of the living conditions on the border – and more generally of a significant part of the modern population – but peace was what people strove to maintain in order to live, as they said, peacefully and "as good neighbours".⁸⁰ Thus, as soon as there was a military alert, they expended a great deal of energy to confirm the peace agreements among the valleys or, if needed, to prevent the monarchies from suspending them. Much of the economic activity on the borders depended on maintaining peaceful relations through either pastoralism or trade.

While the general interest on the border was peace and living "as good neighbours", the reality could be a bit different because of not only the outbreak of the monarchical wars but also the local actions of gangs, the "bandit lords", or simply because of the tensions between one village and another, between one valley and another, for access to natural resources, for example. This is the case of the multi-secular struggle for access to the extensive grasslands on the clearing in the upper basin of the Arieja River on the

northern face of the Pyrenees. Merens (countship of Foix) and Andorra disputed these meadows, especially after the 17th century, when each thought that they had rights that the other thought were theirs in a context in which livestock was an essential asset and having grasslands to graze them was a necessity.⁸¹ We thus enter the framework of the pastoral and peasant wars which had nothing to do with the political border, although it did act as protection or more accurately as additional justification of the exactions, a kind of “screen of violence”,⁸² even more so if it was a time of international war: war had the advantage of concealing the minor local conflicts and turning them into more notorious events. Thus, a certain awareness of the presence of the border became evident as the monarchies clashed with each other. In this sense, as we have stressed throughout this article, the monarchic wars increasingly served as essential waystations towards the establishment of a line, if not a barrier, between peoples who had intense relations and strong ties.

We cannot ignore the fact that the relations were based on a cultural and linguistic underpinning which made it even easier for the Occitan emigrants to modern Catalonia to suffer from a stigmatisation which at times hindered their integration. The primary cause might have been their precarious social and economic situation. Having said that, some of the emigrants played a prominent role in trade which, were it not for the wars, would have erased the political border which they continuously traversed. However, they had to submit to the tax border, which sometimes they tried to avoid... In reality, all the trade privileges and *lligues i patzeries* treaties were yet another factor facilitating communication. Nonetheless, if we look at what happened in the 19th and 20th centuries, the Pyrenees became a truly internalised barrier, the highly visible result of the political history of two states which strove to make the mountains their border. Wars played a crucial role in this process, helping to materialise the borderline and impose it on the people who, either willingly or unwillingly, ended up identifying – more or less perfectly, of course – with the state that encompassed them. Economic and territorial policies (protectionism, road-building, etc.), the nationalisms of the 19th century, schooling and the travel difficulties resolved by the development of the train, and later cars, which replaced mules and could go everywhere, ended the long process of border division. Nowadays, the expected opening of the European borders may once again intensify relations, beyond the superficiality of mass consumption.⁸³

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- [3] Document from the Parliament of Toulouse published in the *Bulletin de la Société Ariégeoise des Sciences, Lettres et Arts* (1893), pp. 263-265.
- [4] Charles VASSAL-REIG. *La guerre en Roussillon sous Louis XIII (1635-1639)*. Éditions Occitania, Paris 1934, p. 101.
- [5] Joan Maria VIDAL I GUITART. *Història d'Andorra*. Anta-lbe, Barcelona 1984, p. 75.
- [6] Alain AYATS. *Les guerres de Josep de La Trinxeria (1637-1694). La guerre du sel et les autres*. El Trabucaire, Perpignan 1997, pp. 23 and 28-29.
- [7] Patrice POUJADE. *Une vallée frontière dans le Grand Siècle. Le Val d'Aran entre deux monarchies*. Pyrègraph, Aspet 1998, pp. 108-109.
- [8] Christian DESPLAT. *La guerre oubliée. Guerres paysannes dans les Pyrénées (XII^e-XIX^e siècles)*. J. et D., Biarritz 1993, pp. 49-50.
- [9] Maurice GOURDON. “Les tours à signaux ou tours de guets dans le haut-comté de Comminges”. *Revue de Comminges* (1907 and 1908).
- [10] They are 45 km in a straight line and 55 km by foot. Ramon SALA. *Dieu, le roi et les hommes. Perpignan et le Roussillon (1580-1830)*. El Trabucaire, Perpignan 1996, pp. 45-46.
- [11] Some of the cases mentioned in: Père FORCAUD. “Relation de la mission faite en 1642 en la vallée d'Aran”. *Revue de Comminges* (1893); Bernard DRUÈNE. “Combats pour Castel Léon. Contribution à la chronique du Val d'Aran de 1642 à 1649”. *Annales du Midi* (1959), pp. 21-42; Bernard DRUÈNE. “Notes pour l'histoire de Vénasque”. *Revue de Comminges* (1954), p. 115; Bernard DRUÈNE. “Une étude de géographie pyrénéenne au XVII^e siècle. Les ‘devis’ de l'ingénieur Thierry, capitaine au régiment d'infanterie de Beauvais”. *Revue de Comminges* (1950), pp. 102 and 109; Núria SALES. *Els segles de la Decadència - Segles XVI-XVIII*. Edicions 62, Barcelona 1989, p. 87.
- [12] Gilbert LARGUIER. “Fiscalité et institutions à Perpignan (XII^e-XVIII^e siècle)”. In: Louis ASSIER-ANDRIEU and Ramon SALA (ed.). *La ciutat i els poders*. PUP, Perpignan 2000, pp. 435-448. The author also notes the importance of the contribution to financing the village walls in creating the “citizenry”.
- [13] This what is demonstrated by, for example, Christian DESPLAT. *La guerre oubliée...*, *op. cit.* For examples of violence among Catalan valleys, see Xavier TORRES I SANS. *La vall de Torelló als segles XVI i XVII: una història de paraires i bandolers*. Eumo, Vic 1995. 190 p.
- [14] Claudine PAILHÈS. *D'or et de sang. Le XVI^e siècle ariégeois*. Arxiu Departamental de l'Arieja, Foix 1992, p. 115.
- [15] Cited by Xavier TORRES I SANS. *Nyerros i cadells: bàndols i bandolerisme a la Catalunya moderna (1590-1640)*. Reial Acadèmia de les Bones Lletres i Quaderns Crema, Barcelona 1993, p. 161.
- [16] Alice MARCET. “Le Roussillon, un enjeu entre la France et l'Espagne (1462-1715)”. In: Jean SAGNES (dir.). *Nouvelle histoire du Roussillon*. El Trabucaire, Perpignan 1999, pp. 163-169; Gilbert LARGUIER. “Dans l'Espagne

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- [17] Núria SALES. *Els segles de la Decadència...*, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
- [18] Núria SALES. *Senyors bandolers, miquelets i botiflers. Estudis sobre la Catalunya dels segles XVI al XVIII*. Empúries, Barcelona 1984, pp. 63-64.
- [19] Guillaume de Joyeuse was a lieutenant general from Languedoc and a fierce opponent of the Protestants.
- [20] On this siege, see Janine GARRISSON. "La 'Genève française' (16^e siècle)". In: *Histoire de Montauban*. Privat, Toulouse 1984, pp. 110-117. The author mentions "des mercenaires royaux envoyés par Philippe II".
- [21] Xavier TORRES I SANS. *Nyerros i cadells...*, op. cit., pp. 150-152.
- [22] We can find a fascinating example of the relations between the two sides in Lluís OBIOLS I PEREARNAU. "El bandolerisme a la Cerdanya: algunes precisions (1526-1593)". In: Àngels CASALS (ed.). *El bandolerisme a la Corona d'Aragó*. Galerada, Cabrera de Mar 2012, especially pp. 187-197.
- [23] Lluís OBIOLS I PEREARNAU. *Lo niu dels bandolers de Catalunya. Els setges del castell d'Arsèguet (1588-1592)*. Salòria, La Seu d'Urgell 2012, p. 60.
- [24] Patrice POUJADE. *Une vallée frontière...*, op. cit., pp. 118-119 and 126.
- [25] Member of the local petty nobility.
- [26] On this topic, see Pilar SÁNCHEZ. "La Inquisición y el control de la frontera pirenaica en el Aragón de la segunda mitad del siglo XVI". *Historia Social*, no. 11 (autumn 1991), pp. 3-22.
- [27] *Dietari de la Generalitat de Catalunya*. Vol. 2. Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona 1990.
- [28] Twenty-four percent were Catalans and 21% Aragonese.
- [29] List published by Lluís OBIOLS PEREARNAU. *Lo niu dels bandolers...*, op. cit., pp. 92-94. Twenty-four percent encompasses everyone categorised as "Gascon" or "French".
- [30] Archive of the Crown of Aragon, Consell d'Aragó, bundle 98, 13/3/1598.
- [31] See August RAFANELL and Albert ROSSICH. "La langue occitane dans la Catalogne du XVIII^e siècle". *Lengas. Revue de Sociolinguistique*, no. 48 (2000), pp. 45-65.
- [32] Antoni FITER I ROSSELL. *Manual Digest de les Valls neutras de Andorra, 1748* (manuscript), Consell General d'Andorra, 1987, f. 285 and 287.
- [33] Salvador GALCERAN VIGUÉ. *Dietari de la fidelíssima vila de Puigcerdà*. Fundació Salvador Vives Casajuana, Barcelona 1977, pp. 40-41.
- [34] Felix PASQUIER. *Coutumes de la ville d'Ax sur Ariège, 1241-1391, 1676*. Veuve Pommiès, Foix 1888, art. 50 and 39; Claudine PAILHÈS. *Du Carlit au Crabère. Terres et hommes de frontière*. Archives Départementales, Conseil Général de l'Ariège, Foix 2000, pp. 296-297.
- [35] "Índex dels privilegis, franquies y exempcions que gosan los habitants de las Valls de Andorra en las terras y dominis del Regne de Fransa". In: Antoni FITER I ROSSELL. *Manual Digest...*, op. cit., f. 285-288.
- [36] A summary can be found in Patrici POJADA. "Realitats frontereres no estatals: les lligues i patzeries". In: Àngel CASALS (coord.). *Les fronteres catalanes i el Tractat dels Pirineus*. Galerada, Cabrera de Mar 2009, pp. 141-163.
- [37] A year and a half later, the western Pyrenees valleys (Bearnese and Aragonese) signed an agreement known as the Treaty of Canfranc.
- [38] The text of the treaty, which is conserved in the Archive of the Parliament of Toulouse (Arxiu Departamental de l'Alta Garona, B 1920), is in Occitan; we can find a Catalan version in the Archiu Generau d'Aran [CGA c. IX-1625 (8c)] published by Pèir CÒTS E CASANHA. *Los derechos de paso, pastos y aguas entre Aran, Comminges y Coserans y su relación con los tratados de Lies i Patzeries*. Conselh Generau d'Aran, Viella 2003, pp. 102-106.
- [39] Arxiu Departamental de l'Arieja, 1 J 87.
- [40] Arxiu Departamental de l'Arieja, 5 E 2311, me Ferriol, Ax, f. 313v (05/05/1641), 315 (07/05/1641) and 316 (07/05/1641), and 5 E 2390, me Tardieu, Ax, f. 846 (04/05/1641).
- [41] Arxiu Departamental de l'Arieja, 5 E 10251, me Serda, Ax, f. 2614 (02/06/1650).
- [42] Regarding the market in Rodès, see Jacques BOUSQUET. *Enquête sur les commodités du Rouergue en 1552. Procès avec l'Agenais, le Quercy et le Périgord*. Privat, Toulouse 1969, pp. 154-155; "Mémoire sur la Généralité de Montauban (1699)". *Revue de Comminges* (1886).
- [43] Eva SERRA and Maria Àngels SANLLEHY. "Comerç transpirinenc a Catalunya segons la documentació de la Generalitat de Catalunya (s. XVI-XVII)". In: Jean-Michel MINOVEZ and Patrice POUJADE. *Circulation des marchandises et réseaux commerciaux dans les Pyrénées, XIII^e-XIX^e siècle / Circulació de mercaderies i xarxes comercials als Pirineus (segles XIII-XIX)*. CNRS and Université de Toulouse-le Mirail, Toulouse, 2005, pp. 473-522.
- [44] "This village is filled with French, who far outnumber the natives", letter from F. de Beaumont to the emperor (Perpignan, 20/08/1536) cited by Fernand BRAUDEL. *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*. A. Colin, Paris reissue 1987, vol. 1, p. 381.
- [45] William MONTER. "Els immigrants francesos i la Inquisició de Barcelona, 1550-1650". *L'Avenç*, no. 120 (November 1988), p. 10.
- [46] William MONTER. "Els immigrants francesos...", op. cit., p. 10.
- [47] *Constitucions de Catalunya*, book IX, Courts of Montsó, 1510.
- [48] There is no way we can cite all of them. However, among others, we shall mention as an example the names of researchers like Valentí Gual, Jaume Codina, Joan Peytaví and Alexandra Capdevila.
- [49] Jordi NADAL and Emili GIRALT. *La population catalane de 1553 à 1717. L'émigration française et les autres facteurs de son développement*. SEVPEN, Paris 1960, 354 p.
- [50] We know about master builders and sawyers from Lim-

- ousin. More than 22% of those from the lands in the central massif in the kingdom of France worked with wood or in construction.
- [51] On this point, see Patrici POJADA. “Les xarxes comercials transpirinenques al segle XVII”. In: Jaume DANTÍ (coord.). *Les xarxes urbanes a la Catalunya dels segles XVI i XVII*. Rafael Dalmau, Barcelona 2012, pp. 55-77.
- [52] See Patrick FERTÉ. “La Nation Hispanica en Toulouse: para una prosopografía de los estudiantes españoles en Toulouse en los siglos XVII y XVIII”. *Historia de la Educación*, no. 19 (2000), pp. 373-412; Patrick FERTÉ. “Les étudiants catalans à l’université de Toulouse du XIII^e au XVIII^e siècle”. In: *Aulas y saberes. Congreso internacional de historia de las universidades hispánicas*. Vol. 1. Universitat de València, Valencia 2003, pp. 397-414.
- [53] Patrice POUJADE. “La Vall d’Aran i les fronteres al segle XVI”. *Afers*, no. 29 (1998), pp. 139-156. From the other side of the border, in the castle of Castilhon (Couserans) there were six soldiers in 1674, while 25 were expected (Guillaume GÉRAUD PARRACHA. *Histoire du pays de Couserans*. Sent Gironç 1994, p. 59).
- [54] Miquel PÉREZ LATRE. “Frontera militar i poder municipal a Perpinyà (1571-1585)”. *Afers*, no. 27 (1997), pp. 362-364.
- [55] Regarding the repression of banditry, see: Xavier TORRES I SANS. *Els bandolers* (s. XVI-XVII). Eumo, Vic 1991, pp. 159-189; Núria SALES. *Els segles de la Decadència...*, op. cit., p. 98; Antonio ESPINO LÓPEZ. “La sociedad catalana y la posesión de armas en la Época Moderna, 1501-1652”. *Revista de Historia Moderna. Anales de la Universidad de Alicante*, no. 23 (2003), pp. 447-472.
- [56] Montserrat PALAU MARTÍ. *Protestantisme i Inquisició a Andorra al segle XVI. Problemes de competències i conflictes jurisdiccionals*. Consell General d’Andorra, Andorra la Vella 1990, pp. 33-34.
- [57] Patrice POUJADE. *Une vallée frontière...*, op. cit., pp. 128-129.
- [58] The case of Aragon was studied by Gregorio COLÁS LATORRE and José Antonio SALAS AUSENS. *Aragón en el siglo XVI. Alteraciones sociales y conflictos políticos*. Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza 1982, pp. 387-395; for Catalonia, see Xavier TORRES I SANS. *Els bandolers...*, op. cit., pp. 175-177.
- [59] Xavier TORRES I SANS. *Els bandolers...*, op. cit., p. 177.
- [60] Patrice POUJADE. *Une vallée frontière...*, op. cit., pp. 125-126.
- [61] Emmanuelle REBARDY-JULIA. *Un évêché entre deux mondes. Elne/Perpignan XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles*. El Trabucaire, Perpignan 2009, p. 248.
- [62] See Manuel ABIZANDA Y BROTO. *El índice de privilegios del Valle de Arán*. IEI, Balaguer 1944, privileges no. 53 (31/12/1565) and 87 (05/02/1570).
- [63] Montserrat PALAU MARTÍ. *Protestantisme i Inquisició...*, op. cit., pp. 53-59.
- [64] Pau de la FÀBREGA PALLARÈS. *L’oferiment de retrocessió del Rosselló a Espanya (1668-1677)*. Rafael Dalmau, Barcelona 1962 (reissued in 1994), 64 p.
- [65] Here we shall not discuss the special case of Llúvia, which, as a town and not a village, remained within the Spanish monarchy, thus creating a kind of territorial enclave separated from the rest of the “Spanish” Cerdagne with which it was connected by a road with “international” status.
- [66] Alicia MARCET. “La Cerdagne après le Traité des Pyrénées”. In: *Actes del Primer Congrés Internacional d’Història de Puigcerdà (1977)*. Puigcerdà 1983, pp. 172-174.
- [67] Marc CONESA. *D’herbe, de terre et de sang. La Cerdagne du XIV^e au XIX^e siècle*. PUP, Perpignan 2012, pp. 118-121, and documents, pp. 526-527.
- [68] Document from the Archive of the Eastern Pyrenees (Perpignan), 1 C 1393, cited by Alicia MARCET. “La Cerdagne après...”, op. cit., p. 174.
- [69] Peter SAHLINS. *Fronteres i identitats: formació d’Espanya i França a la Cerdanya, s. XVII-XIX*. Eumo, Vic 1993, p. 107.
- [70] Regarding all of this, see Daniel NORDMAN. *Frontières de France. De l’espace au territoire (XVI^e-XIX^e siècle)*. Gallimard, Paris 1998, pp. 23-122.
- [71] Alain AYATS. *Louis XIV et les Pyrénées catalanes de 1659 à 1681. Frontière politique et frontières militaires*. El Trabucaire, Canet de Rosselló 2002. 876 p.; Òscar JANÉ CHECA. *La identitat de la frontera pirinenca. Efectes socials i polítics al nord de Catalunya des de la creació de Montlluís (1677-1698)*. Diputació de Girona, Girona 2008. 261 p.
- [72] Daniel NORDMAN. *Frontières de France...*, op. cit., p. 325.
- [73] For the Cerdagne, we shall refer to the study by Peter SAHLINS. *Fronteres i identitats...*, op. cit., which is fully devoted to this topic.
- [74] See Òscar JANÉ CHECA. *França i Catalunya al segle XVII. Identitats, contraidentitats i ideologies a l’època moderna (1640-1700)*. *Afers*, Catarroja and Barcelona 2006. 459 p.
- [75] Ramon SALA. *Dieu, le roi et les hommes...*, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
- [76] Institut d’Estudis Ilerdencs (Lleida), C/44, 24/07/1767.
- [77] This is the evolution described by Chevalier (Michel CHEVALIER. *La vie humaine dans les Pyrénées ariégeoises*. Milan-Résonances, Toulouse 1984 (1956), p. 453), for the relations between Salardú and Sèish, which perfectly illustrates what could also be found in other areas of the Pyrenees, such as Bigorra (Annie BRIVES. *Pyrénées sans frontière. La vallée de Barèges et l’Espagne du XVIII^e siècle à nos jours*. Société d’Études des Sept Vallées, Argelers and Gasòst 1984. 221 p).
- [78] We should recall that the Vall d’Aran is located in the north of the Pyrenees, where it was easily supplied, but under Spanish sovereignty.
- [79] Maria Àngels SANLLEHY I SABI. *Comunitats, veïns i arrendataris a la Val d’Aran (s. XVII-XVIII): dels usos comuns a la dependència econòmica*. Vol. 2: *El marc econòmic*. Garsineu, Tremp 2007, p. 295.
- [80] The peace always upheld in the agreements among the valleys: the expression “as good neighbours” can be found in the *patzeries* renewed in 1653 and 1654 between

the valleys of Àneu, Aran, Castilhonés and Couserans, and countless times in the correspondence exchanged among the communities of Salardú and Sèish.

- [81] The intendant of Roussillon attributed the meadow to Andorra (known now as the “Solana andorrana” or Andorran meadow) in 1687, but this decision did not put an end to the dispute, which lasted until the end of the 19th century (Claudine PAILHÈS. *Du Carlit au Crabère...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-163).

- [82] The expression comes from José FORNÉ. “Le paravent de la violence institutionnelle”. In: *Pays pyrénéens et pouvoirs centraux (xvi^e-xx^e s.)*. Association des Amis des Archives de l’Ariège, Foix 1995, pp. 379-389.

- [83] Regarding this “mass consumption”, see, for example, Sophie AVARGUEZ and Aude HARLÉ. “Consommer à la frontière: usages et perceptions en territoire Catalan”. *Revue Territoire en Mouvement*, no. 29 (2016) <<https://tem.revues.org/3047>>

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